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2. Even though the US has not formally  
approved a new CSCP there has been a significant  
~~change~~ in national level strategic thinking. These  
changes being reflected in most aspects of our  
nonmilitary posture and our flexible and adaptive  
responses, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to the  
entire spectrum of the Communist Threat.

3. Adoption of JSCP is to:

2. Establish national objectives and policies of the  
US in terms of military objectives, strategic concepts,  
tools which are in consonance with actual US  
military capabilities.

5. Constitute a direction to CINC for the  
conduct of ops in cold, low-intensity

c. Overall strategic objectives planning guidance

See also C, J (7), (C/F), 11

6: Major Major Through  
Confederate, CP,  
Recovery + Reconciliation.

Military Obj.

✓ 8. Overall military objective of the US is to provide  
for the production of military strength as an  
element of national power to achieve US objectives,  
and to sustain hostilities so long as such assistance is  
~~un~~ compatible with US interests, but being prepared  
to conduct any war in a manner designed to  
further the interest of the US and its Allies and to  
defeat the enemy.

GW

9. The military objective of the US for general war is  
to defeat the Axis-Soviet Bloc

[GW defined as an conflict between the major  
powers of the communist + free world... i.e. what's  
wrong with China, and in what Soviet Bloc? Vietnam?  
Russia? Are better wars GW?]

This includes (1) (1) (1) (1)

3. Destroying or neutralizing the military capabilities of the enemy, while retaining ready, effective and controlled US strategic capability adequate to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, retention of US military advantage over the enemy, - by potential enemies, at any point during or after the war
3. Minimizing damage to the US and its Allies, and in all events limiting such damage to a level consistent with national survival and independence.
- c. Bringing the war to an end on the most advantageous possible terms for the US and its Allies.
- d. Defeating the US and the vital areas.
- e. Preserving and retaining as many of its allies as possible.

10. CW obj:

2. To deal swiftly & effectively with any CW in a manner & on a scale best calculated to bring the war to a conclusion on terms advantageous to the US and to minimize the risk of hostilities breaking into GW.

3. Specifically and visibly to be compatible with US interests, to conduct war in a manner which:

- 1) Protect the interests of friendly peoples involved.
- 2) Enhances Albin's credibility and effectiveness.
- 3) Provides for effective & major utilization of indigenous forces.
- 4) Discourages future aggressors from resorting to armed force.
- 5) Controls the scope and intensity of the conflict to minimize the risk of escalation to GW.
- 6) Concludes the war on terms advantageous to the US.

172. Stop us certain other bills which may be  
introduced in one of a number of other options.  
It is suggested that neither capital offense  
nor committed to \$100 may be employed  
concerning such and such.

F

c. Potential of C-R weapons must be exploited to the maximum possible. This objective includes use of C-R weapons whenever tactically appropriate without regarding them as any special form of warfare. The uninhibited use of disabling but non-lethal agents may provide the critical breakthrough.

e. The qualitative capabilities of men - particularly regard to his determination to succeed, to his ability to exercise judgment, to discriminate, to adapt to rapidly changing conditions, situations, to cope with unanticipated developments

strongly indicate that military systems will no longer will have a significantly higher flexibility [survivability, operational effectiveness] and will be much more responsive to the requirements of the missions involved.

GW: Military objective of the US for general war, a war with the USSR, [not in GR: Disagreement over role of China in 1965], is to defeat the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

This includes:

- a) Reducing by military action the capabilities of the USSR and Comm. Chin to the point where they have lost their will and ability to continue the war against the US and its Allies. [not like PNS: to wage war]
- b) Defending the US and other vital areas.
- c) Preserving and retaining as many of its Allies as possible.
- d) Achieving a residual power relationship with other nations sufficient to survive as a free nation and pursue US national objectives.
- e) Concluding ~~objec~~ hostilities with a military position favorable to the success of the US + Allied post-war objectives.

[NOTC: all of this is consistent with an interpretation of GR as war with USSR, in which both US and USSR had limited objectives; war ends without total defeat & surrender of SO — though this is not what AF had in mind].

CW: Nuclear weapons will be used in CW when authorized by the President. Nuclear ops will be planned against targets that contribute directly to the enemy military effort in the area of hostilities.

will and ability to continue the war against the US and its Allies. [not like USSR to wage war]

- 1) Defending the US and other vital areas.
- 2) Preserving and retaining as many of its Allies as possible.
- 3) Achieving a residual power relationship with other nations sufficient to survive as a free nation and pursue US national objectives.
- 4) Concluding ~~objets~~ hostilities with a military position favorable to the success of the US + Allied post-war objectives.

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CW: Nuclear weapons will be used in CW when authorized by the President. Nuclear ops will be planned against targets that contribute directly to the enemy military effort in the area of hostilities and against other targets that constitute an immediate threat to friendly forces in that area. Situations may occur in which authorization for the use of nuclear weapons will be delayed. There will be other contingencies which do not warrant the use

[Any?]

The US, under conditions of general war, will launch [not "probably"] in initial nuclear strategy attack against optimum-risk target system (the NSC), as an essential anti-track to be accomplished under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated.

[Tasks now included in NOP also]

H-1946 expansion: during limited war or prior to a GW.

- a) Plans will stipulate that nuclear weapons will be used as [when?] authorized by the Pres.
- b) CW plans should include appropriate provisions for partial implementation [No nuclear?] in the event such action becomes necessary.
- c) War plans will be executed when directed by the JCS. [Pres?] by alerting messages with specifically designate those nations against which operations are to be conducted.

of military objectives, strategic concepts and tasks which are in concurrence with actual US military capabilities.

Contain a directive to commanders of the unified & spec. Comms. for the conduct of ops in cold, limited and general war.  
[Abandon the trichotomy]

Provide strategic & logistics planning guidance.

In public briefs for definition, employment & support of US military forces in the conduct of ops, advise.

[Since CP related to actual current capabilities, curious that OP is identical to 1965.]

[How will actual capabilities permit US to achieve objective. Hence, how important to change capabilities? e.g.: C&C caps?]

→ Def of S-S Bloc (includes) and other countries may be determined to be dominated by International Communism.

[i.e. who is the enemy in GW? Not in BNSP or as]

GW: like OP, but without phrase "consistent with the foregoing"

GW: like OP (unlike BNSP): "to continue the war"

translate nature!

VSCP

of military objectives, strategic concepts and tests which are in consonance with actual US military capabilities.

Constitute a directive to commander of the unified + spec. commo. for the conduct of ops in cold, limited and general war.  
[Abandon this terminology]

Provide strategic + logistic planning guidance  
... to military services for disposition, employment + support of US military forces in the conduct of ops, and

[Since CS related to actual current capabilities, curious that OP is identical for 1965.]

[How will its actual capabilities permit US to achieve objectives?  
Hence, how important to change capabilities? e.g. C & C etc.]

→ Def. of S-S Bloc (includes + other countries may be determined to be dominated by International Communism.)

[i.e. Who is the enemy in GW? Not in USSR or CP]

GW: like OP, but without phrase "consistent with the foregoing"

GW: like OP (unlike DNSP): "to continue the war"

Plans will take into account:

a) US over-all military situation will be

enhanced by making it clear in all actions that our  
military power is available for use at any time and that  
we know the will to use this power as required.

b) GW should be conducted on a scale and in a manner

which indicates that the US has the will to accept the

consequences of general war. [See Annex C]. Operations  
will be conducted in such a manner as to afford us the  
maximum opportunity to take the initiative in using our  
power, but without any unnecessary

c. US action against the USSR might be conducted at

a time later than GW in order to:

1) Achieve those US objectives attainable shortly of

GW.

2) Give the enemy to remain in his course of action

3) Afford an opportunity for the enemy to conduct  
a military operation.

4) Establish the basis for further negotiations

5) Place the US in a better position to implement GW plans

252. Ornithodoros sp.

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3. In US, under condition of general war, will launch a nuclear strategic attack in accordance with the SIP, against designated targets of US R&B strength.

[When? 1502:50] coast of SW probably  
will be characterized by the absence of intensive  
severe blows by both sides. [1502:50] During  
winter gales

the President's role and the reliability of that  
resolution would reasonably forecast, and the  
secret service ~~to advise~~  
provides for selective responses to the extent  
possible with due consideration to the degree of  
life and safety of the committed forces.

126 (2) The West's allies now have an overall military superiority against which all courses of action must ultimately be weighed. This strength is the source of our greater totals of action in the complete spectrum of war on a world-wide basis even though we do not match the S-S Bloc in all respects. Recognizing that success in warfare is as much a function of such intangible factors as will, psychological considerations and the like, the decision making process must not be unduly influenced by mere <sup>types</sup> strategical evaluation.

6 (1) (above) The

6. initiate a nuclear attack against the leadership  
of the other nation or one of its major allies.

7. CW plans should encourage ~~but~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~use~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~an~~ <sup>any</sup> ~~means~~ of  
military initiatives. Total partial implementation without  
attempt to clandestinely support the same may, in due to imminent  
CW <sup>elements</sup> ~~elements~~ of planned reinforcements.

8. It is recognized that, during the period of  
~~the plan~~, engagement between forces of the US and the  
USSR may occur which, in themselves, do not of  
and nature as to constitute sufficient cause for  
the US to implement CW plans. The circumstances, location  
and world climate under which an engagement occurs  
will be major factors in determining what our actions  
against might be. It is not possible to determine in  
advance the precise parameters of possible engagement  
under which the conflict.

9. In it, at least two forces, military objectives, and thereby  
engage the Soviet in lesser action locally, presenting  
them with attempts of disengagement, withdrawal

or other measures to prevent further escalation.

32. CW Nuclear Weapons Policy: The decision to use nuclear weapons will be made by the ~~in~~ will

affect the intent of the NSC 3: (1) making further effort to end the war at a non-mutual level, but in� front to use nuclear weapons under regional ~~in~~ <sup>COO</sup> (2) Mutually Assured

(3) The US will, at the time nuclear weapons are authorized for use by the President, provide additional guidance regarding

33. Nuclear weapons will be employed:

1) If they are used against US and allied forces

2) If their use is necessary to maintain the tactical integrity of the forces engaged, or

3) If a deliberate political decision is made to

~~communicate~~, by de minimis use, our will and ability to employ nuclear weapons, if necessary.

(See Consideration of Policy Engagement)

with appropriate nuclear response (1) Mutually

considerable attack with nuclear response when

national US interests cannot be defended at the

non-nuclear level

40 C-C

2 In order to ensure that military force is applied effectively, national authority will be delegated to the commander(s) concerned for the conduct of ops.

3 Unified and specialized commanders will conduct operations; the JCIS will provide strategic guidance and insure the timely organization and support of forces engaged.

4 Conduct of nuclear warheads in GW will be subject to a greater degree of control than would be the case in GW

GW posture

16c. Command, communications & information reporting system to permit controlled, coordinated, and informed direction of US forces - combat ops.

15. SW opns

[?]

" 3. SW might result from escalation or  
hostilities along S.W. which were not  
initially intended by either side to lead to SW or,  
less likely, it might be initiated by the USSR with  
a nuclear onslaught with little or no warning.

[Contd. 150P.]

However, it is estimated that they will not deliberately  
bring a general war to bear so long as they are  
convinced that the US and its allies can hesitate to  
deploy a sufficient strength to inflict a degree  
of damage unacceptable to the USSR. In order to  
knowlege that a Soviet attack against the US  
or to honor a treaty commitment, the US forces may  
be required to take the initiative. [See 150P. Pgs.]

I am sure under conditions of nuclear exchange involving  
the boundaries of the US and the USSR, planning must recognize  
that the use of nuclear weapons in certain situations & areas  
may not be authorized. Is not politically feasible?

5.1 Small conflict between two powers

the amount of force used indicates the  
real nature of the belligerent as implied  
in the actual course of a war.  
Belligerent is in progress.

The armed conflict short of war, wherein of  
incidents involving the most important  
of the military forces of two or more nations.

incident: brief clashes or other military  
disturbances generally of a transitory nature and  
not involving protracted hostilities.

5-8 place the whole complex USSR, Com China, etc

8-10 in 8-10 to India etc

England's invasion

and other countries may be included to 36

To be dominated by International Communism

[Cuba? / 2100 miles?]

Soviet Bloc. Soviet USSR

12. b (2) The US and its Allies now  
(not in ISOA)

14. ~ Transition from Non-linear to Linear Operations.

Non-linear ops will be a goal

communicate with the situation such ops will

gather information and provide the option

to engage the enemy non-linear forces on a

scale of our own choosing [?] before having

to decide to initiate the use of nuclear weapons

a. However if the enemy does not suspend

military operations and if a significant US

force is directly engaged and the traditional

intention is that there is neutralized the

Opponent could be required to end the

necessary mission to

1) Early analysis section; no

2) Strategic Plan if required.

The decision cannot be made in advance, nor can a valid judgment be made in advance, as to which [of above?] course of action would best serve interests. However, US should be prepared to meet reasonable attacks with military response where vital US interests are threatened, deferred to the non-mission level.

15c. Planning will take into account both the capabilities of the US and other forces. In this regard, it is recognized that the situation is a Threat Option and be influenced considerably by the actions taken (or contemplated) by our own or other countries.

## 16. GW Posture.

The GW posture comprises all military forces and will include:

2. Response, surveillance and flight nuclear offensive forces which:

① In the short term, [?] are capable of emerging from a nuclear exchange with a clear military advantage [?]

② In the long term, will possess the highest practicable degree of alert and be capable of a range of options; including those made possible by a secure arsenals [not in 150P] to increase control of response and enhance military flexibility

P.150P: no short term - longer term conditions?

In Vietnam ~~the US~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~dependent~~

~~on~~ ~~US~~ ~~or~~ ~~any~~ ~~other~~ ~~Nation~~ ~~for~~ ~~Deployment~~

~~Intelligence~~ ~~or~~ ~~any~~ ~~other~~ ~~information~~

~~was~~ ~~potential~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~US~~

~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~. ~~The~~ ~~ability~~ ~~of~~ ~~US~~ ~~military~~ ~~forces~~ ~~to~~ ~~kill~~ ~~the~~ ~~population~~ ~~should~~ ~~be~~ ~~substantially~~ ~~reduced~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~current~~ ~~convention~~ ~~and~~ ~~used~~ ~~for~~ ~~emergency~~ ~~civil~~ ~~disaster~~ ~~recovery~~ ~~operations~~

~~An~~ ~~estimated~~ ~~10-20~~ ~~million~~ ~~persons~~ ~~may~~ ~~be~~ ~~required~~ ~~to~~ ~~perform~~ ~~emergency~~ ~~relief~~ ~~work~~. ~~However~~, ~~such~~ ~~operations~~ ~~would~~ ~~not~~ ~~have~~ ~~any~~ ~~direct~~ ~~military~~ ~~implications~~ ~~and~~ ~~thus~~ ~~restrictions~~

~~It~~ ~~is~~ ~~possible~~ ~~that~~ ~~as~~ ~~many~~ ~~as~~ ~~48,000,000~~ ~~persons~~ ~~may~~ ~~be~~ ~~killed~~ ~~and~~

~~12,000~~ ~~are~~ ~~injured~~. ~~If~~ ~~so~~, ~~restrictions~~ ~~would~~ ~~be~~ ~~imposed~~

~~on~~ ~~the~~ ~~first~~ ~~strength~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Ground~~ ~~forces~~ ~~and~~ ~~units~~

~~and~~ ~~Special~~ ~~standards~~ ~~for~~ ~~accidents~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~

~~Armed~~ ~~forces~~ ~~would~~ ~~probably~~ ~~be~~ ~~reduced~~. ~~Stringent~~

~~military~~ ~~control~~ ~~&~~ ~~restriction~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~civilian~~ ~~economy~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~

~~various~~ ~~military~~ ~~activities~~ ~~would~~ ~~be~~ ~~imposed~~. ~~The~~ ~~time~~

~~planning~~ ~~of~~ ~~US~~ ~~deployment~~ ~~is~~ ~~likely~~ ~~to~~ ~~delayed~~

9c. its form of CINCPAC, July 1963, will ensure

that all aspects of current flexibility and  
alertness are clearly & specifically identified  
in plan and provided for a planned creation

orders and messages.

GW 34

24. It will consist of a combination of nuclear, non-nuclear  
actions until the initial emphasis on employment of  
nuclear weapons to accomplish the stated objectives.

The governing principle in the employment of nuclear weapons  
is that the US must emerge from initial nuclear  
use with a clear military advantage. This advantage  
may well include the planned survival in certain  
areas of the Far East [of known dissident problems]  
as dictated, on a continuing basis, the emergency areas  
Offensive acts created by initial nuclear operations will be  
exploited. Offensive defenses are to exhibit the strategic  
advantage gained by the nuclear force and to bring the war to

a successful conclusion for the US.

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19. Control flexibility of response

5. Because listed courses available course of action, the implementation of which will provide a greater degree of control. It is recognized that these broader courses of action could be significantly affected by the precision and completeness of our information on enemy strengths. Accordingly, commanders will include in their plans a concise statement of the risks inherent in their implementations. Their course of action, designed to minimize destruction not directly associated with a specific attack mission.

- 1) Withholding all attacks on certain countries.
- 2) Attacking a restricted category of targets in certain countries, e.g. neutralization of air defenses.
- 3) Concentration of striking systems used on targets in attacked, e.g. manned aircraft against targets requiring precise delivery or missile on targets requiring less precision.

Exhibit

Proposed plan to account any revolutionary outbreak that may occur in Abkhazia. Bulgaria, Gud, East Timor, Georgia

Russia Planning should provide for the following military actions:

1) Logistic support.

2) Deployment of Special Forces.

3) Naval ops.

4) Direct military intervention by military forces

Takes into account two situations: a) when US forces are not directly engaged, otherwise an

aggression of Abkhazia

Military action to

arrange time regard to intrusion in Poland

17. Plans for employment of non-SIOP forces, to the extent possible, will be based upon the same degree of autonomy existing as applicable to SIOP forces, but related to the attack option of the SIOP, will be constricted to SIOP mission.

Ops by CINCUS may take the form of defensive [?] ops for an extensive period of time followed by offensive ops, or early offensive ops in the event of a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, for our planning purposes, ops could fall into one of two broad categories i.e. defensive ops in the event of initiation of CW under condition of treated warning only [III, IV?] or offensive ops at an early time in the event of pre-emptive strike in accordance with attack option I-II.

SCP

30. One recognized that presents, in due course  
the broad capabilities are required to support  
sustained major non-military operations.

Continuing efforts will be made in using logistic  
capabilities to conduct sustained non-military oper-  
ations.

CW Ops

36. Should CW winning the ocean, the US will:

1) Route supply & effectively to repel the aggressor.

2) Be prepared to shift & expand the area of conflict  
in such a way so that CO + Allied strength can be  
more effectively applied. [?]

3) Exploit opportunities to liberate problem

territories previously lost. Strong / aggression. [?]

4) Fight in concert with allies, & eventually, if necessary

5) Limit damage within H. area of conflict, control  
and the achievement of military objectives.

c. Recognizing that substantial elements of forces committed to the initial attacks will survive and be available for subsequent strikes and can be considered as an integral element of the regime's reserves.

51OP: power for option intimation of committed forces of the SNCs and for coordination with allied external commands, for all preplanned attacks on selected targets DGT as weight of effort.

5c. Any conflicts which arise in force proportion of 51OP forces for the various attack choices will be resolved in favor of optimization for attack option V. [2]

VTS responsibility: Provide annual guidance for 51OP

Answers should be 100% S1OP, 100% S2OP.

Task II: Short or execution of controlled, deliberate attacks

1. Nuclear Reserve. The retention of, or the capability to reconstitute quickly, a reserve is an indispensable requirement for all types of warfare and is particularly significant in general war. [1] Within current capabilities, the requirement for a nuclear reserve can be fulfilled to a degree by:
  2. Nuclear capable forces not purely committed to initial strikes; e.g. the aircraft carriers, SAC command and control [?] and training units aircraft and other forces not committed to the squadron or initial command over forces.
  3. Continued assignments in planning for use of surviving forces in follow-on and "in-call" roles against targets, or replacement

o. To assist in developing a climate of opinion abroad which will permit the US to exercise its military forces within and without regions.

9. C-E systems must be provided which will ensure continuity of operations and facilitate secession of command for the command posts and communication facilities that are estimated to be primary targets in a limited or general war.

[CP's?]

random generation techniques [?]

15. Plans must provide for avoidance using Comm system which will provide minimum essential commands for C+C

CW

14. Maximum advantage will be taken of new techniques affording survivability of communications through hardening, mobility, concealment, dispersion, alternate routing and multiple means to insure maintenance of capability to control the military

power of the U

informally to US 20

political and military liaison

[?]

## I Mil. C-E objectives

4.c To develop & maintain C + C, and communication systems which are continually <sup>(and) available</sup> operational

C-E system, which, stable, adaptable & survivable.

### Thirdly Principles

~~systems~~ & facilities must be responsive to the C-E segments of military in the chain of military command [national] that are associated with the reliable, selective, flexible, autonomous control of military forces.

6. C-E design, planning, engineering & construction efforts will be based on a full consideration of possible political, military and natural influences of a destructive or disruptive nature and possibly even exploitation of destroying the radiation of friendly forces.

29

[INFO; SENSORS; BOMBS-ARM; COMM w/ENEMY]

iv) Authorize every air or naval base directly  
affecting bases engaged, on a selective basis.

If this measure is authorized for me by  
the President, it may be necessary for the JCS  
to provide additional guidance to cover the  
particular situation.

Answers:

limited to forces engaged [supporting] in the conflict.

will

c) If a deliberate political decision is made to demonstrate, by discrete use, one's ability to employ nuclear weapons. Specific guidance will be provided to the decision to demonstrate. For planning purposes, small gains.

2) Provide for restrained use in order to minimize risk of pre-emptive attack by:

i) Confining strikes to major military targets or targets of military significance.

ii) Selecting targets for attack which are capable of being destroyed by discrete employment of relatively low yield nuclear weapons.

iii) Minimizing civilian losses.

(3) Examples of type targets to be attacked include:

i) Ground forces directly engaged.

ii) Airbase enemy aircraft.

iii) Enemy naval forces at sea.

If there was necessity to maintain the tactical integrity of the forces engaged, etc.

(See 142-152)

Several guidelines, other than minimum Intervention, as:

- a) Reduce enemy engaged  $\rightarrow$  military power.
- b) Reduce enemy <sup>military</sup> power directly affecting engaged forces. [?]
- c) Limit intervention to ensure S-S appreciation that the US's military  $\rightarrow$  expand activities to S-S if necessary.
- d) For accomplishing the foregoing:

  - i) Confine nuclear strike to military targets outside the USSR if practicable, and if consistent with (a) + (b) above.
  - ii) Hold civilian casualties and damage to a minimum consistent with military necessity.
  - iii) Minimize dangers of a pre-emptive start on the US by all available preventive measures and also by ensuring that actions made on ensure defence system

(1) Modern weapons will be employed [mention  
of request in Annex C]

(2) If they are used against US & allied forces

2) as a ~~nuke~~, attack in kind.

3) are ~~not~~ and dealing with situation at  
the time, initiate nuclear attacks with all available  
force short of cessation of hostilities. [?]

4) Return the option of (3) + (2),

i) Confirm to military target.

ii) Attack delivery systems at point of launch  
allow no survivors.

iii) Extend nuclear weapon utilization to the  
air and sea.

5) React quickly and deliberately decisively but on  
a controlled basis so as to indicate clearly  
that the US is willing to expand hostilities to  
general war, if necessary.

6) Take cognizance of allied policies but do not  
allow allied views to impede regard of  
unilateral action.

The nature of subsequent nuclear strike in G41 coast  
be predicted with great accuracy.

These also will be decentralized in many elements  
and will be -

c) Maintain the neutralization, if previously  
disrupted, of the primary neutralizing capability of  
the S-C place.

Option

? The Chances of using the track system are minute [?]  
and it is, therefore, to be proposed as an  
last priority [?] [Priority]

military assistance to Allies

development of Nato, with Allies and <sup>friends</sup> neighbors

b. Translate national objectives & policies into  
military objectives, provide concept for the  
employment of forces and define basic under-  
takings which reflect these mil. obj.

Strat. Appraisal

Any US or Allied retreat in critical situation  
will progressively intensify Soviet tactics aimed  
at achieving advantage, inhibiting their inclination  
to employ force & threats of force.

c. The Com will continue to attempt to inflict  
defeats, from less light, gradual more lightly  
broken, and alternating intelligence and

tractability

erosion of moral

Diplomatic message and the role of Com.

international relations which they began  
following WW II.

Europe: They Bloc seems to  
a) begin the division of Europe;

they

want to: convince the world that they are  
determined to pursue their objectives in the form  
of high risks.

Fear of militant Soviet nationalism, the  
increasingly independent attitude of France, British  
reluctance to support a firm military posture in  
Europe, and general reluctance among a majority  
nato members (with exception of Greece, Turkey,  
and FRG) to accept higher level of effort and  
to meet NATO military goals may cause more problems  
in NATO.

The chances are more likely to engage in military action than are the Soviets even with high risk of US intervention.

— to employ military action in NATO areas may be successful, and provide a most convincing test of the credibility of the Western Alliance. Despite possible benefit, the risk of escalation or the loss of prestige that would accompany US withdrawal in the face of a collective show of force will probably make this course of action unattractive to the Bloc.

On the other hand, actions which appear to place the responsibility for initiation of limited hostilities on NATO and whose limits may be felt manageable by political actions, may be used to effect the first partition of Germany, discredit Western actions and weaken NATO.

CW objectives (and a subsidiary aim CW+GW)

1. To create conditions under which the US and its friends can pursue its objectives by peaceful means.
2. To ensure adequate capability to wage and win war across the entire spectrum using the range of weapons and forces appropriate to the situation.
3. To found and support allies to maximise the strength of the Free World, to cope with the political threat of World Communism and the military threat of the S-S Bloc, and to enhance the resolution of the Free World to oppose communist objectives.
4. To support the organisations of the UN Charter and other international orgs. of which the US is a member and whose objectives it supports.
5. To ensure the credibility of US war power in deterring aggression, so as to make the major powers 25 by the Communist Bloc of irresponsible course of action.

To Seize opportunities to promote divisive  
interests and forces within the S-S Bloc and  
target territories where such action may favor  
US interests and further US objectives by:

1) Development of satellite territories of effective  
disident forces under close control for use in  
covert, C + GW to disrupt every communication  
and confuse every effort.

[THREATEN?] [ ]

2) Aid to subversives and paramilitary actions  
to organize, train and equip paramilitary forces  
to maintain & enhance internal security against  
covert & overt, indirect & direct aggression

3) Colossal use of military forces, economic  
revenue, foreign policy

foreign & cultural

progress for the achievement of national objectives

c. Preserving and maintaining as many of its  
friends Allies as possible.

d. Achieving a residual power relationship

with other [?] nations sufficient to  
ensure as a free nation, to pursue US  
national objectives and to achieve US and  
allied hostile objectives. [?]

[<sup>other strategic assets</sup>  
Minimize damage? Introduce deterrence?

Post-attack surviving? Maintenance of  
control? Preservation of national control:]

6 Star Forces

To offset the initial advantage gained in the initial nuclear offensive, and assist in forcing a conclusion to the war on terms advantageous to the US.

21d. Operations following the initial nuclear offensive will be conducted as prescribed [?] by the JCS to the extent that communications & control structures will permit. However, commanders must be informed, in the event

State American

Mil Obj

6.2 Basic objectives of the US are to preserve a free & independent US ensuring our own security and upholding the fundamental values of our institutions; an open world of free nations conducting international affairs under the rule of law; just settlement of international disputes without recourse to force; and economic growth, political stability, and social justice throughout the world.

b) The basic military objectives are to deter aggression, prevent unprovoked outbreak of war; and, should war occur, conduct the war in a minor and on a scale calculated to achieve US objectives, and to conclude the war on terms advantageous to the US.

CN

- f. To deter or frustrate attempts by communist-dominated powers [Cuba?] to extend political, military or ideological influence by threat or use of military forces, or by coups, subversion, infiltration, or guerilla warfare.
- g. To reduce the likelihood of warfare or the expansion of incidents into limited or GW.
- h. To exploit opportunity to conduct or support special operations within S-S Bloc territory where appropriate.
- i. To discourage independent development of nuclear weapons production facilities by other than selected Allies and to secure US participation in control of any nuclear weapons capabilities by "alliance".
- j. To assist in civil defense in order to minimize the vulnerability of the US to attack.

6. To develop and maintain C+C systems  
and communications systems which are  
continuously operational and immediately  
responsive to governmental decisions as to  
initiation, regulation and termination of  
military operations and which, as a bar to  
this destruction, avoid excessive concentration of  
these essential elements

p. To deter the S-S Bloc from initiating CW,  
or, if the deterrent fails, be prepared to force  
a conclusion to the war on terms advantageous  
to the US and its Allies.

g. To deter the S-S Bloc from initiating CW or, if  
the det. fails, be prepared to conduct operations  
with such weapons and forces as will result  
in the destruction of the will and capability of  
the S-S Bloc to conduct further CW operations,  
and hence terminate a war based on these

advantages to the US.

GW

3. In addition to CW obj; US military off. force  
is to defeat the aggressor in a manner and on  
a scale best calculated to be to the  
advantage of the US without undue  
escalation.

GW.

Dy?

9. The military obj of the US in GW is to  
defeat the S-S Bloc. (Dy?) This includes:

2. Conducting the ops by US forces alone  
first init, in conjunction with operations by  
other forces will result in the destruction of  
the will and capability of the Soviet Union  
to conduct further military operations, thereby  
promptly conclusion of hostilities on terms  
favorable to the US and its allies.

be Proceeding to the defense of the US and other  
friendly areas.

be affected to a... to degree by the outcome  
of initial nuclear offering/decision situation.

The US will maintain a capability to accomplish  
its S&W objectives regardless of conditions under  
which initiated. During initial operation,

The US will want offers & defense alternatives

to minimize damage to the US and its allies,  
to decrease further enemy threat, to extend enemy  
forces and their support in order to achieve a  
strategic advantage from which to force enemy

\* Capitulation? Increases US leaders' C+C content?  
US receives control? At the earliest possible time.

Opposing appetites created in the initial nuclear op-  
eration will be exploited.... To attempt is made to  
reduce the length of war

o Response, survivable and flexible nuclear  
offensive forces capable of emerging from  
initial nuclear operation with a clear  
military advantage, possessing the highest degree of  
alert, and capable of a range of attack options

(i) Prevent nuclear escalation, if possible, and prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

(ii) War is compatible with US interests, conduct war in a manner which ensures allied solidarity and effectiveness and discourages future aggressors from resorting to armed force, and which controls the scope and intensity of the conflict so as to minimize the risk of escalation to GW.

to Exploit opportunities to liberate peoples and territories previously lost through cowardly or foolish aggression

c. Whenever practicable, extend the extent of friendly peoples. This may include the planned arrival in certain areas of the S-S Bloc of known dissident people who can disrupt, on a continuing basis, the enemy rear areas.

(m) limit damage within the area of conflict consistent with achievement of military objectives.

The US will risk the loss of allied support, elimination of neutrals, or GW if necessary, in order to defeat aggression.

QW Day 3

US forces may be required and must be prepared to take the initiative if so directed by the President; for example, in response to knowledge that an attack against the US is imminent. Initiative? or to honor treaty commitments. However, US policy precludes the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. The US plans are now no longer provocation. If GW if it occurs, might evolve from limited hostilities or be deliberately initiated by the Soviets or as many as one or may not be preceded by a period of heightened tension. The onset of GW probably will be characterized by the delivery of intensive nuclear blows by both sides. Tension

1. I mention a -& return to a military strategy

to insure attainment of policy objectives would

achievement of war and post-war objectives,  
and with the regiment to consider the  
dictates of military necessity.

(ad.)

1. To make every feasible effort to keep the world  
a non-nuclear land but be prepared to use nuclear  
weapons when required. Military planning for US forces everywhere  
will be based on a flexible and selective  
capability including nuclear capability for use in  
Event A.  
In case authorized by the President:

a. To met non-nuclear attack with nuclear response  
when vital US interests cannot be defended at the  
non-nuclear level.

b. Be prepared to engage in the limited + selective  
employment of nuclear weapons, as directed, to  
demonstrate US resolution.

c. Be prepared to expand area and/or scale of

(C) conflict in order that US + Allied strengths may be  
more effectively employed.

9

so strategy becomes increasingly unlikely after 1962

### Strat Con

a US military posture will be maintained which, in conjunction with allied forces, provide for the military superiority of the Free World and afford an adequate basis for eventual operations to

defeat communist forces at all levels of aggression.

5th column principle are.

a. US forces shall be deployed + deployed to deter both CW + GW (DCR)

b. While maintaining a strong overall deterrent

discreet emphasis will be given the application of a wider range of military actions in order to achieve national objectives.

c. To insure the successful conclusion of any conflict or dispute in which the US may become involved

by resolute action from the US extent, and by conducting any war is a manner designed to:

1) defeat the enemy

2) Further the interests of US and its Allies

x 3) Provide a basis for the defeated opponents to  
leave responsible members of the post-war

my first impressions always changing (b)

from my impressions

7 feet || 180 200 220 240 260

con

is a world-wide, integrated and survivable C&C system is urgently needed for conduct of war which might involve selection and execution of more than several attack options based upon the assessment of such factors as type & nature of enemy attack; type & manner of US response; status of surviving forces; degree of damage sustained; etc. A centralized display, on a global basis, to include pertinent strategic-warning, early-warning, bomb alarms, RDS and force-state information data is required to assist the decision making process and conduct of the war.

Global systems

34

4. Moved bombers: mission availability,

sensitivity, operational flexibility.

Effects:

d. Strategic missiles: mission flexibility - rapid reprogramming and retargeting capability, variable trajectory and selective launch.

e. Flexibility is needed to necessary to insure adequate coverage of priority targets

[timings, cross-targets?] as well as possible controlled response.

6. Ground recon: select + destroy targets known or

suspected to exist but which cannot be located with sufficient accuracy for economical

destruction (e.g. too much collateral damage) by

missile systems, for hard or aside targets, for

assessment of bomb damage [and?] for intell.

collection + follow-on info.

in order to provide within the military sphere, the essential foundation for our initiative in foreign affairs, the military must anticipate those force characteristics and capabilities which would contribute most effectively to a favorable military + psychological balance in the conflict between Communism + the Free World.

The potential enemy must be confronted continually with new uncertainties in the military sphere which he is forced to consider + control. [says exec?] The sum of these uncertainties must be such that he cannot hope to prevail at any given moment.

would weaken inter-Single ties.

No doubt they would like us to (now, or  
is any independent nation with its own trigger; + OK, France.)

But does NATO want that? Consider effect on SC  
expectations; with our relative security, our threat  
is between the Single, or than NATO.

Views of Anst, Nitze, Gromyko, Pres, Robbie, McN, Seng, Lugar,  
Rostow, Molotov,

Annex E R&D

R&D planning must consider the military objectives

it places and envisage the capabilities needed to

achieve an acceptable margin of superiority to

accomplish these objectives. The intelligence threat is

an essential element of R&D planning, but successful

R&D planning must look beyond the threat as

presently defined or forecast. The US national

military posture and associated R&D planning must

not be limited to reaction. To the present, no even

foreseeable activities of potential enemies, whether

planning — which is in progress with the leading firms

already down, is currently doing, or may reasonably

be expected to do — is fundamentally inadequate

for success in the struggle for military superiority

battle for intelligence superiority; counter

surveillance + target acquisition systems; a target

located way beyond our defenses

AB-6 G2